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IT'S NOT MY JOB!
Michael B. Kelly*
Where does Restitution fit in the law school curriculum? In
what course should it be taught? There are at least three candidates:
Remedies, Restitution, and Contracts. At a conference of Remedies
teachers, one might expect me to expound the case for Remedies.
However, as the title may suggest, I reach a different conclusion.
Contracts offers significant advantages over the alternatives. I want
to lay them out here.
First, let me define terms. By Restitution, I mean the cause of
action for Unjust Enrichment, not merely the ways we might
measure the benefit to the defendant when another cause of action
justifies recovery. If we focus only on the remedial components of
Restitution, the questions posed above are too easy: all of the above,
plus some others. Any substantive course where a violation gives
rise to a restitutionary remedy should address those remedies. Thus,
Securities Regulation should address rescission for unregistered
securities. A course covering criminal sentencing, where restitution
often is a condition of probation, should address its brand of
restitution.' Restitution should be mentioned in every context where
it might arise.
The cause of action for Unjust Enrichment is not susceptible to
such a facile answer. Securities Regulation covers a lot of ground,
including statutory provisions allowing restitution. But taking time
out to teach the general action for Unjust Enrichment diverts it from
its normal goals. Similarly, a course covering criminal sentencing-
where restitution means something quite different from Unjust
Enrichment-is an odd place to cover a civil cause of action for
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. J.D. 1983,
University of Michigan; M.A. 1980, University of Illinois-Chicago; B.G.S.
1975, University of Michigan.
1. Restitution here often resembles damages. A thief may be required not
only to return the stolen goods, but also to pay the cost of repairs caused by
forced entry.
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Unjust Enrichment. Other courses with limited subject matter pose
the same difficulties. Their coverage has a different focus. As a
result, their casebooks have a different focus. We cannot expect
these courses to cover Unjust Enrichment in anything more than a
superficial manner. In fact, these courses would be more easily
taught if students had some familiarity with Unjust Enrichment
before coming into the course.
Second, let me suggest that the question matters. While I have
no systematic evidence, my own experience suggests that many
students manage to graduate with virtually no idea that Unjust
Enrichment offers an alternative cause of action to Tort and Contract.
If they know anything about Restitution, it is from Fuller and
Perdue's article 2-- studied in Contracts-which treats Restitution as
an interest that might provide a measure of recovery in an action for
breach of contract. Having no formal exposure to Unjust
Enrichment, they may not (no, I did not) spot the issue in cases
where it offers the most direct claim for relief.3 Teaching students-
as many students as possible-about the existence of this cause of
action seems vital.
At this point, it may seem that I have defined my way to the
conclusion. Once I posit that every student needs exposure to Unjust
Enrichment, of course it must be included in a course that all
students take (probably because they are required to take it). Of the
three alternatives identified, only Contracts fits that description.
Universality is part of my argument. The key problem with
teaching Restitution as a separate course is that relatively few
students elect it. We can dream about making Restitution a required
course-maybe in the first year, to coincide with Contracts and
Torts. But as a practical matter, Restitution seems likely to remain
an upper-class elective course. We can discuss ways to encourage
students to elect it, such as testing it on the bar exam (a strong
incentive in some states) or providing better counseling as students
make course selections. However, these efforts, even if undertaken
with energy (far from a given), will fall short of introducing
Restitution to all or even most students. The same might be said of
2. See Lon L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in
Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 54-55, 60-61 (1936).
3. My suspicions are shared by others. See Andrew Kull, Rationalizing
Restitution, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1195-96 (1995).
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Remedies, though the case is closer. Remedies is tested on some bar
exams, creating an incentive for students to take it. Large
enrollments are common, at least at some schools.4 This approaches
the goal of universal exposure to the concepts of Unjust
Enrichment-if Remedies courses deal with Unjust Enrichment.
Still, many schools either do not offer Remedies or do not promote it
as an essential part of a student's education. Thus, Contracts would
hold an advantage if universality were the only goal.
Yet the argument cannot rest there. We could achieve
universality by teaching Restitution in Civil Procedure or any other
required course. If the link between Contracts and Restitution is no
greater than the reference in Fuller and Perdue, 5 then the arguments
applicable to Securities Regulation and Criminal Procedure would
apply to Contracts as well. At that point, Remedies and Restitution
would have the upper hand. At least in these courses, Restitution is
part of the core of the subject-it holds an undeniable claim to
significant coverage.
This Article seeks to establish that the claim is just as strong, or
even stronger, in Contracts. Restitution-not just the remedy, but
the cause of action for Unjust Enrichment-is integrally tied to the
action for breach of contract. Understanding Restitution is critical to
understanding Contracts--or, at least, the two actions interact at so
many different points that discussing Restitution in the Contracts
course is as natural as discussing Sales (Article 2 of the UCC) in the
course. Teaching section 2-207 (the UCC's innovative revision of
the mirror image rule) is no more closely related to offer and
acceptance than Restitution is related to contract defenses and half a
dozen other issues central to the Contracts course. That claim, not
the claim to universality, provides the foundation for my contention
that Restitution should be taught in Contracts.
One further preliminary consideration seems in order. The
argument relies on a definition of Restitution that does not exclude
contract rescission. Andrew Kull has proposed such an exclusion.
6
However, I disagree. Rescission of a contract usually fits
comfortably within Unjust Enrichment as Kull defines it. We may
4. At the University of San Diego, we typically offer three sections each
year. About three-fourths of the students elect the course.
5. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 2, at 71-75.
6. See Kull, supra note 3, at 1219-20.
Winter 2003]
890 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:887
wish to limit the occasions when rescission may be granted. I share
Kull's concern for allowing rescission when enforcing the contract
seems more appropriate-as when a party who has nearly completed
performance seeks to rescind the contract, usually as a means of
obtaining a better deal than the one negotiated in the contract.
7
However, this problem suggests that material breach should not be a
basis for rescission, not that rescission falls outside Unjust
Enrichment.
Unjust Enrichment sits at the center of rescission. A party
rejects the contract (for any valid reason), offers to return any
benefits received under the contract, and requests the return of any
benefits bestowed under the contract. This last point is critical.
Plaintiff seeks to recover the benefit received by the defendant from
the plaintiff. This is a straightforward definition of Restitution-not
just restoration,8 but Unjust Enrichment. The defendant has been
enriched at the expense of the plaintiff, having received performance
from the plaintiff. Plaintiff seeks to recover the amount of the
enrichment. The focal point of the dispute is whether the enrichment
was unjust.
Of course, it is not unjust to retain the benefit of a contract, any
more than it is unjust to retain a gift or benefit provided by a
volunteer. No obligation to compensate the person providing the
benefit (aside from the compensation specified in the contract) arises
in either context. Thus, a contract might establish a defense to a
claim of Unjust Enrichment, where it established a right to keep the
performance. Grounds for rescission negate the claim that the
defendant has a right to retain the benefit by negating th6 contract
itself. Rescission is nothing more than the judgment that the contract
does not create a right to retain the benefit. Wiping out the contract
7. See Andrew Kull, Restitution as a Remedy for Breach of Contract, 67
S. CAL. L. REv. 1465, 1467 (1994).
8. Kull treats rescission in the course of discussing remedies that provide
restoration when the underlying rationale falls outside Unjust Enrichment law.
See Kull, supra note 3, at 1219-22. I do not think that the argument here
undermines the larger position Kull stakes out in the article. I accept Kull's
position that Restitution focuses on Unjust Enrichment. We differ, if at all,
only in that I believe rescission involves Unjust Enrichment, putting it near the
core of Restitution, not on the sidelines with remedies that provide restoration
without Unjust Enrichment.
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does not establish a right to recovery; it simply removes an
impediment to the action for Unjust Enrichment.
9
Is this just a facet of contract law? One could try to define it as
such. Kull does so in an effort to preserve the conceptual clarity of
Restitution.10 Yet to preserve the conceptual clarity of Contract, the
opposite result seems justified. Contract, too, has a central
organizing premise: the law of voluntarily agreed exchanges.
1
Contract law speaks to the legal consequences of breach of an
enforceable agreement. 12  It addresses unenforceable agreements
only to define them out of the law of Contracts. Once defined away,
Contracts has nothing more to say about the rights and wrongs of
partial performance. 13 Courts that enforce contract law also enforce
tort law, property law, and Unjust Enrichment. A claim for how to
handle a rescinded contract may arise in any of those contexts;
however, it is not Contract.
Restitution, on the other hand, provides an easy explanation for
the result. The measure of recovery is the benefit bestowed-not as
a volunteer, but under color of a contract, though a contract that
ultimately does not establish the just position between the parties.
14
This is not some aberrant transformation of Unjust Enrichment
principles, but an ordinary application of them.
If that point is valid, then Restitution runs throughout Contracts.
The easiest place to start is not with contract remedies, but with
contract defenses. Duress, undue influence, mistake,
misrepresentation, and incapacity all provide grounds for rescission.
That is, they arise not only when a breaching party is sued and seeks
to defend the contract action with these defenses, but also when the
breaching party seeks compensation from a non-breaching party for
9. See Kull, supra note 7, at 1466-67.
10. See Kull, supra note 3, at 1197-98.
11. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1979).
12. See Kull, supra note 7, at 1466-67.
13. Contract law does not govern the resolution of agreements that are not
contracts (no matter how close) any more than criminal law governs the
resolution of wrongs that are not crimes (no matter how close) or defamation
law governs the resolution of statements that are not defamation (no matter
how close). Conduct may be legally actionable even if it does not breach a
contract, violate a criminal statute, or constitute defamation. However, in each
case, the legal consequences are governed by other principles, independent of
those the conduct did not implicate.
14. See Kull, supra note 7, at 1466-67.
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the benefits bestowed under a voidable contract. 15 Without an action
for rescission, fraudfeasors (for example) could avoid any liability
simply by obtaining the victim's performance up front. The
perpetrator will not need to sue the victim, so the defense will be
unimportant. Only if the ground for rescission permits the victim to
sue the fraudfeasor will justice be available. Thus, whenever the
contract should not be enforced, the law needs a cause of action for
Unjust Enrichment.
Teaching contract defenses without mentioning actions for
rescission seems unnatural. It could be done. Books could limit
themselves to cases where the victim was sued on the contract.
Professors could avoid mentioning the alternative: that the victim
might need to sue the other party. Such willful blindness to one
way-perhaps the primary way-defenses arise requires some
justification. The possibility is there, begging to be raised and it
would be strange to ignore it. Once the rescission claim is raised,
can it possibly be explored adequately without noting the cause of
action for Unjust Enrichment that forms the basis for the claim?
16
Like all rhetorical questions, this one deserves a little attention.
One might assume that rescission here really belongs in Torts.
Misrepresentation can be a tort, wherein a refund would be part of
the damages. Duress, too, could be a tort. Incapacity and Undue
Influence might be addressed in Property or another course that deals
with wills. Contracts instructors could hope that Unjust Enrichment
would be addressed in these other courses, as an adjunct to these
lessons. There are pragmatic objections here: other courses may
omit the topics; 17 if covered, each instructor may expect another to
cover Unjust Enrichment. Communication might overcome these
concerns. But the connection between Contracts and Restitution is
15. See, e.g., Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H. 481 (1834) (holding that the
plaintiff, who agreed to work for one year but left after nine months without
the defendant's consent, was entitled to recover a reasonable sum for the
services he actually performed).
16. Even if Kull is right and rescission is not a claim for Unjust
Enrichment, the similarity between Unjust Enrichment and rescission might
deserve note. That similarity could be explored-and Unjust Enrichment
distinguished-only if students received some grounding in Unjust
Enrichment. So perhaps my argument is not as dependent on the definition as I
first thought.
17. Torts often omits Misrepresentation or covers it quite quickly. Property
may spend relatively little time on wills.
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more pervasive than just the defenses. The full inter-relationship,
once recognized, should overcome the relatively weak claim that
Torts or Property might cover Unjust Enrichment as it relates to
these defenses.
Restitution also plays a role when discussing contract formation.
When one party claims it did not assent to a contract, a similar
problem arises. Where the objection is raised before either party has
begun to perform, restitution is unnecessary. However, once either
party has conveyed even part of the consideration, refusing to
enforce the contract (based on the absence of assent) does not end the
matter. The recipient has no claim to retain the benefits of part
performance without compensating the provider. 18 One could teach
assent without confronting this component, focusing on cases where
either there has been no performance or there was assent. Yet again,
the abdication seems unnatural. Having raised the issue of assent,
how do we justify ignoring the ramifications of that issue? Not, I
think, by assuming another course will deal with it. No action for
breach of contract will permit recovery, since the contract is
unenforceable (it never arose). No tort exists-refusal to assent is
not a tort, in most instances. One might place the restitution claim in
the Property course-a non-donative transfer that did not convey
good title. 19 However, again, the possibility that Property will cover
it offers a relatively weak reason to ignore the issue in Contracts.
The absence of consideration poses an equally important
context. When an agreement fails for want of consideration, partial
performance may require a restitutionary recovery. Again,
Contracts teachers could ignore the implications by avoiding cases
involving partial performance. More commonly, the problem is
relegated to promissory estoppel, where reliance creates a claim for
enforcement. 2 1 In this manner, a claim for restitution might recede.
But what about the estoppel claim that fails, say because the
promisor had no reason to expect reliance of this sort?22 Restitution
remains the primary way to deal with the failed contract. Again,
18. See Kull, supra note 7, at 1468-71.
19. See Christopher T. Wonnell, Replacing the Unitary Principle of Unjust
Enrichment, 45 EMORY L.J. 153, 196-204 (1996).
20. See id.
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979).
22. See id.
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unlike the defenses, other courses seem unlikely to address the
material.
Consideration is important for another reason. Most books
discuss the exception for moral obligation.23  That is, where a
promisor has already received a benefit from the promisee and makes
the promise out of a sense of moral obligation to compensate the
promisee for the benefit, the promise is enforceable.24  The
restitutionary basis of this exception is patent. Indeed, one wonders
why the promise is necessary at all; a benefit from promisee to
promisor might justify recovery without a promise. The exception is
less an exception to the requirement of consideration and more an
exception to Restitution rules that might reject or limit recovery. For
instance, the most famous case involves a rescuer who saved his
employer from a large pine block thrown from an upper-story
window (by the rescuer).25 Some courts might limit recovery to
health care professionals, where fees are more easily established and
where the expectation of compensation more credible.2 6 In effect,
these rules call this rescuer a volunteer. The promise makes room
for Contract law to provide a remedy even if Restitution would not.
Contracts teachers could teach that exception without discussing the
cause of action for Unjust Enrichment, but the lesson is so much
fuller placed in context of Restitution.
The statute of frauds offers another example. Perhaps the
discussion simply repeats the points raised above. Though taught in
chapters on formation or formality, the statute resembles the
defenses. It arises when both parties initially expected a contract, but
where one has changed her mind and now pleads the statute as a
justification for nonperformance.27 Contracts again spends a good
deal of time discussing the extent to which reliance justifies
enforcement (at least compensation for the reliance interest) in these
23. See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS § 4 (The Foundation Press, Inc. 5th ed. 1995).
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 86.
25. See Webb v. McGowin, 168 So. 196 (Ala. Ct. App. 1935), cert. denied,
168 So. 199 (Ala. 1936).
26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 86(2)(a) (denying
compensation where the promise "conferred the benefit as a gift or for other
reasons promisor has not been unjustly enriched."); Fuller & Perdue, supra
note 2, at 74.
27. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 110.
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cases. However, the restitution claim preceded the reliance claim
and does not suffer from many of the problems the reliance
exception poses. 28 Even if reliance does not justify an exception to
the statute (either generally or in the specific case), recovery for
restitution would follow. No gift was intended, no contract gave a
right to retain the benefit, so retention would enrich the defendant
unjustly. Again, we could ignore this component in the Contracts
course but it seems vain to hope that any other course will address
this uniquely contractual twist.
It may seem as though I am making the same point over and
over. If, for any reason, a contract is not enforceable, partial
performance may give rise to a claim for restitution.29 The specific
reasons-defenses, assent, consideration, statutes-may not seem to
make the argument any stronger when repeated. In fact, they do.
Each context involves a different chapter of the typical Contracts
casebook. Having located Restitution in the chapters on Assent,
Consideration, and Defenses, the pervasiveness of Restitution's role
in Contracts begins to emerge. Restitution is not just a single point
in a big course. Rather, it is a background matter lying behind nearly
every chapter in the book. Indeed, the decision about whether to
stretch the law of Contracts to cover situations plausibly but not
squarely within Contract law may depend in part upon the
availability of other legal doctrines to provide just compensation if
Contract is not extended. Thus, understanding Unjust Enrichment
may help students understand some of the reluctance to enforce
borderline agreements that courts sometimes display. Nor is
Restitution's influence limited to the situations where contractual
obligations do not exist. Even once the validity and enforceability of
a contract are acknowledged, Restitution continues to arise.
28. The point of this Article does not require a full discussion of how a
robust exception for reliance threatens erosion of the statute bordering on
repeal. Here, let me simply note that the message of the statute-"get it in
writing before you rely"-differs substantially from the message of the
exception for reliance--"rely immediately to avoid the requirement of a
writing." Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 110, with §
139. This characterization naturally omits many nuances, mostly related to the
reliance interest rather than to Restitution. To avoid turning this Article into
yet another tirade against reliance, I will leave these nuances unexplored.
29. See Kull, supra note 7, at 1468-71.
Winter 20031
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Consider the issue of material breach as an excuse for
nonperformance of a contract. This issue does not involve the
validity of the obligation ab initio. Rather, it arises when a party
seeks to avoid obligations under an admittedly enforceable
contract. 30 When material breach precedes performance by the non-
breaching party, no restitution is required. 3' A declaration that the
contract no longer requires performance is all the party requires.
Where partial performance has already occurred, however, the non-
breaching party may require compensation. Restitution provides a
(controversial) means to provide that compensation. The outline of
the argument was identified above: Plaintiff seeks return of the
performance rendered under the contract, defendant claims a contract
entitlement to keep the performance, plaintiff replies by arguing that
the breach justifies rescission, destroying the claim under the
contract. If the reply succeeds, the remedy is to make defendant pay
plaintiff for any benefit already received-not necessarily at the
contract price, but at the fair market value of the services.
32
The remedial issue here drives the entire controversy over
material breach. The law could decree that any breach justifies
termination of the contract by the non-breaching party. Yet if it did,
that would invite parties to cancel contracts whenever the market had
changed in their favor. Where services today are worth more than
the contract price, plaintiff would seek rescission, even on the most
insignificant of breaches. Restitution would exceed the contract
price, allowing the non-breaching party to recapture a benefit
initially bargained away: the right to charge more if the market price
changed. The requirement of a material breach arises almost entirely
from concern that parties might act strategically, canceling contracts
for petty reasons, and perhaps even inducing the other party to
breach in order to take advantage of the right to cancel and seek
30. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237.
31. See id.
32. Where a contract is divisible, a court may order payment of the contract
price for the portion of the performance that has been received and cancel only
the portions that were not performed. See id. § 240. Where the contract
cannot easily be divided into corresponding pairs of part performances that can
be taken as agreed equivalents, division is impossible. Plaintiff may recover
the fair market value of the performance today, measured either by the amount
defendant was enriched by the performance or the amount defendant saved by
not having to pay someone else to provide the performance. See id. § 371.
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restitution instead of expectation. 33  Here, more than ever, the
Contracts course needs to establish Restitution as the backdrop for
the doctrine. Without it, the doctrine itself is harder for students to
understand and apply.
At the risk of reiterating the argument in a context only slightly
different, let me raise impracticability and frustration as yet another
example. Here again, the contract is valid initially. Subsequent
events excuse performance under the contract-just as a material
breach excuses performance. Yet, the right of one party to suspend
or cancel performance based on impracticability or frustration will
not end the issue if the other party has already performed part of the
contract and has not yet been compensated for that performance.
Absent a divisible contract, the party must rely on Restitution as the
basis of her claim.
34
You will notice that I have not yet discussed Restitution in the
context of a remedy for breach. The restitution interest identified by
Fuller and Perdue35 arises in yet another chapter. There, it serves as
a possible remedy when neither defense nor excuse arises. 36 I saved
this for last in part because I think this application really duplicates
the other aspects covered above. Restitution is not, in fact, a remedy
for breach of contract. To put plaintiff in the position she would
33. Material breach may not go far enough. By allowing rescission for
breach in some cases, the problems can arise, especially where rescission
would produce a recovery in excess of damages for breach. Kull's masterful
analysis of these issues needs no elaboration here. See Kull, supra note 7.
34. In this context, I find Kull's argument that the issues really fall within
Contracts, not Restitution, more persuasive. He states that the real issue is
interpretative: whether the contract, expressly or by implication, makes it just
for the person who received the performance to keep it. See Kull, supra note
3, at 1209-10. Yet it seems to me the interpretation is still aimed at the
defense, not the claim. One party seeks to recover an unearned benefit, the
other claims a contract right to the benefit. Contract law governs the
legitimacy of the asserted defense, but, if the defense fails, Unjust Enrichment
provides the basis for recovery. Unlike rescission for invalidity, an
interpretation of the contract could provide the basis for recovery. If great
portents turn on whether we infer a clause requiring return of unearned
performance or simply negate a defense against a general principle requiring
the return of unearned performance, I will not quibble. I maintain at least,
however, that understanding Restitution will help students understand the
choices Contract law makes here, even if the choices should not be ascribed to
Restitution law directly.
35. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 2, at 71-75.
36. See id.
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have occupied if the wrong had not occurred requires expectation
recovery, not restitution.37 If the wrong-the breach, that is-had
not occurred, plaintiff would not have recovered the fair value of her
performance, but the contract rate. Any restitution in excess of
expectation can be justified only if the contract is eliminated as the
proper measure of recovery. That, in turn, requires a basis for
rescission. When seeking restitution for breach, that typically means
plaintiff must show a material breach.38  Plaintiff then elects to
cancel the contract and recover the amount of Unjust Enrichment.
This election of remedies is not merely a technicality. It explains
why the breach produces a recovery that leaves the plaintiff better off
than if the contract had been performed. Of course, contract law
could eliminate this feature; it could limit recovery to the expectation
interest, regardless of restitution. That, in effect, rejects material
breach as a ground for rescission, a perfectly plausible doctrine. In
so doing, we would wipe restitution from the Remedies chapter and,
perhaps, from the chapter on material breach, but not from the other
chapters.
Of course, the best books include more than just restitution for
breach. They include restitution sought by the breaching party.39
Here again, it is awkward to explain why the breaching party
deserves any recovery at all without introducing the cause of action
for Unjust Enrichment. Defendant did not breach, so it cannot be a
contract claim. Defendant committed no tort either. The breaching
party's only claim is to benefits bestowed (but not compensated)
prior to the breach (after accounting for any losses the non-breaching
party suffered as a result of the breach).
My claim here is not that Restitution should be taught anew in
each of these chapters. Rather, I contend that Unjust Enrichment
arises in so many portions of the Contracts course that the cause of
action should be introduced at the outset of the course. This could be
done in the traditional case method, laying out a few Unjust
Enrichment cases and socratically helping students to identify the
(existence and) components of the cause of action. Once the
fundamentals are established, students (with or without cues from the
37. See id.
38. See Kull, supra note 7, at 1468.
39. See, e.g., RANDY BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES & DOCTRINE (Aspen
2d. ed. 1999).
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professor) may recognize Restitution when it arises in later chapters.
They will be armed to discuss these issues on a much more
sophisticated level whenever the professor elects to make the
Restitution aspects explicit. When the professor elects not to be
explicit, at least the students have the tools to sort out claims based
on part performance.
On this take, Remedies may be the third best world for teaching
Unjust Enrichment. A course in Restitution might be best, if we
could get enough students to take it.40 A course in Contracts is an
excellent place to teach Restitution, independently of the fact that
everyone takes the course. We teach it in Remedies largely because
we cannot rely on Contracts professors. Rather than let Restitution
fall through the cracks, we take the onus upon ourselves to teach the
cause of action for Unjust Enrichment.
I want to conclude by noting how odd this is. I think Remedies
occupies much the same position as Securities or Criminal Procedure
when it comes to teaching Unjust Enrichment. Remedies is not
about causes of action. We do not teach liability rules covered in
Contracts or Torts, except peripherally. We do not teach liability on
copyrights or § 1983, either-and we should not. Our cases and our
lessons focus on how to provide an appropriate remedy, given that
liability has been established under whatever rules govern. We
cannot avoid liability issues entirely. Some discussion of the wrong
is inherent in applying the standard of putting plaintiff where she
would have been had the wrong not occurred. Yet we do not see
Remedies as the course where students should learn liability rules.
Restitution is the one exception we make-if we make any at all-
and we make it reluctantly. We make it only out of fear that
Restitution, the remedy, cannot be taught unless students understand
Restitution, the cause of action (a.k.a., Unjust Enrichment). If only
to avoid the confusion of having two different animals identified by
the same name, we must address the issue in some way.
Perhaps all I have done is to set forth a grievance against
Contracts teachers. This is the wrong audience in which to voice a
call for reform among Contracts teachers. Yet our fear that
Restitution may fall through the cracks remains justified until
40. Other courses offer somewhat more opportunity to contrast Restitution
with similar doctrines, but that argument might justify teaching Contracts in
the Torts class, a fate I do not seek.
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Contracts courses really do include significant discussion of Unjust
Enrichment. I do not propose that Remedies professors change
practices until our Contracts professors change theirs.41 Contracts
professors, pressed by reforms that reduce the number of credit hours
for the course and/or assign responsibility to cover Sales in addition
to Contracts generally, may find it increasingly difficult to alter their
courses in the manner proposed here. So perhaps this Article simply
bemoans the realities of life at a law school.
Or possibly a few Contracts professors may read this Article.
Many may already be doing just what I describe-perhaps at your
school, where a little communication will usher in a better day.
Perhaps we should continue to teach Unjust Enrichment as a review,
for people who missed it the first time around.4 2 At the very least, I
hope that identifying the close relationship between Contracts and
Restitution helps us focus our teaching of Unjust Enrichment. Some
argue that Restitution enforces Contracts that people should have
made (but did not make).43 While rejecting that view, I nonetheless
think the close ties between Contracts and Restitution are an
important component of any discussion of Restitution.
41. This can be done on a school-by-school basis. Once the Contracts
professors at Washington and Lee respond, the Remedies teachers here can
adjust, even if the Contracts professors at the University of San Diego never
catch on. The number of transfer students is sufficiently small not to let
potential gaps there drive our practices.
42. Students often are counseled to take Remedies in their final semester
because it serves as a review of Contracts, Torts, and other courses taken
earlier. I find the advice both annoying, since I do not want to teach a review
of Contracts and Torts, and unimpeachable, because cases in Remedies books
often do raise a number of contract issues that serve to reinforce lessons
introduced during the first year.
43. Conversation with Christopher T. Wonnell, Professor of Law,
University of San Diego School of Law (Oct. 2000).
